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What is the “Meaning” of “Marriage”? 
CONNIE S. ROSATI* 
In his essay on the meaning of marriage, Richard Arneson speculates, 
from a prioritarian consequentialist perspective, about appropriate state 
policy with regard to private relationships involving love, sex, and 
childrearing.1  Arneson’s aim is not to defend particular policies; rather, it is 
to identify the values advanced by marriage as traditionally conceived and 
to explore ideas about alternative social arrangements for promoting these 
values.  I find much to agree with in Arneson’s wide-ranging discussion.  I 
generally concur, for instance, with the substantive positions he takes on the 
issues of same-sex marriage, monogamy, and the state’s interest in 
advancing the welfare of children.  Our disagreements lie more at the level 
of theory than practice, for while I share Arneson’s interest in designing 
policies that advance human welfare, I do not share his consequentialist 
framework.  Time constraints prevented me from delving into these 
disagreements when I commented on his essay at the “meaning of 
marriage” conference.  While I cannot explore them fully even here, I will 
say a bit about our theoretical differences in the more extended commentary 
that follows.  My hope in so doing is both to sharpen my earlier comments 
and to offer a few speculations that bear on our efforts to understand the 
meaning of marriage and to resolve complex issues in this area. 
I shall begin with the limited remarks I offered at the conference.  
Arneson has addressed these remarks in his revised essay just as one 
would have expected from within his theoretical framework; and given 
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his starting point, his reply strikes me as entirely reasonable.2  Still, it is 
the framework about which I have doubts, and it is these doubts which 
leave me unsatisfied, at least in certain respects, with his reply.  My plan 
is to go beyond my earlier comments in two ways.  First, I will offer a 
few, quite general reflections prompted by the conference papers and 
sessions.  Second, I will use these reflections as an opening for presenting a 
different framework—a different understanding of the theoretical 
underpinnings of any appropriate state policies with respect to private 
relationships involving love, sex, and childrearing.  Although I find this 
alternative framework the more appealing of the two, my aim is not to 
settle the issue of which to adopt in thinking about the meaning of 
marriage; rather, it is to expose what I worry may be missed by the 
framework Arneson employs.  As already noted, I generally agree with 
Arneson’s substantive positions, and our shared views could fairly be 
described as the opposite of conservative.  Nevertheless, I  hope to 
suggest how one might begin to vindicate conservative thinking, not 
about the proper form of marriage and family, but about the special, 
foundational role of marriage and family in social life. 
I.  ARNESON ON THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE 
Arneson helpfully sets out two quite different normative approaches to 
the state’s role in regulating the private affairs of love and childrearing.  
According to the Lockean natural rights approach, since consensual sexual 
relationships may produce children, and the children thus produced may 
negatively impact the rights of those who do not consent to bear the 
consequences of childrearing, even a “night watchman” state may 
legitimately see to it that children’s minimal needs for care are met.3  That 
is, even such a state has an interest is seeing to it that, in one way of another, 
people fulfill their obligations to see (minimally) to the well-being of any 
children they produce, preparing them for adult life.  Beyond its interest in 
protecting the rights of those who have not consented to bear the 
 2. Arneson also sent me helpful written comments in response to an earlier 
version of this extended commentary.  I have added a few qualifications in light of his 
remarks, and in a couple of places, I explicitly mention his reactions in footnotes, but the 
many insightful points he raises deserve a more detailed response than I can undertake to 
offer here.  As his reactions make clear, the theoretical issues that seem to separate our 
approaches are enormously complex.  I will cite to these written comments as “Comments 
from Richard Arneson, to Connie Rosati.”  When I mention Arneson’s “reply” to my 
commentary, I will be referring not to these comments, but to the response he offers in 
the final version of his article. 
 3. As representative of the Lockean libertarian position, Arneson cites ROBERT 
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).  Arneson, supra note 1, at 979 n.1.  See 
also JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas P. Peardon ed., The 
Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690). 
ROSATI.DOC 10/5/2005  11:37 AM 
[VOL. 42:  1003, 2005]  What is the “Meaning” of “Marriage”? 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1005 
 
possibly negative effects of childrearing, the Lockean approach 
considers the state to have no legitimate interest in restricting family life 
or regulating how people arrange their private relationships.  In 
particular, the Lockean approach regards the state as having no legitimate 
role in coercing or restricting people for the sake of their own welfare.  
As Arneson puts it, “Lockean adults are perfectly at liberty to enter into 
less than optimal or even self-destructive marital arrangements if they 
choose.”4
In contrast, Arneson favors an approach in which the normative 
standard that governs state regulation of family, love, and childrearing is 
given by prioritarian consequentialism.  As Arneson explains it, the 
prioritarian tells us that the state’s policies toward childrearing and 
personal relationships ought to be selected on the basis of what will 
produce the best outcome in terms of people’s welfare, with a “thumb on 
the scale” for those who are worse off.  The prioritarian “assigns greater 
moral value to obtaining well-being gains for people, the worse off they 
would be without those gains.”5
Arneson observes that welfare is enhanced by good childrearing 
practices—being well brought up increases a person’s lifelong well-being.  
It is also enhanced, he notes, by engaging in pleasurable casual sex.  
Arneson comments, in passing, that if humans were capable only of such 
low-level intimacy, then the state ought to promote “both the frequency 
and the quality of [casual sexual] encounters.”6  Just what he envisions is 
not entirely clear, though I confess that his remarks brought to mind the 
scene in which Woody Allen’s Sleeper character has his first happy 
encounter with the state-issue “orgasmatron.”7  We need not investigate 
the matter further, however, for as it happens, humans are capable of, 
and benefit far more from, something that goes well beyond casual 
sexual flings, namely, committed sexual friendships, or “CSFs”—relationships 
marked not only by sexual intimacy but by close friendship and shared 
 4. Arneson, supra note 1, at 981.  
 5. Id. at 984.  
 6. Id. at 983.  
 7. SLEEPER (United Artists 1973).  In response to my mention of Allen’s film, 
Arneson observes that when a person “properly seeks simple pleasures, there is no 
reason to eschew any useful technology.”  Comments from Richard Arneson, to Connie 
Rosati 1 (2005) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).  I assume, however, that 
Arneson would accept some such qualification as “except when the use of that 
technology seriously risks impairing a person’s ability to pursue more beneficial sources 
of satisfaction.” 




life projects, which may, but need not, include childrearing.  Accordingly, 
the state should promote both good childrearing and CSFs; it not only 
legitimately may but ought to regulate each in the interest of advancing 
welfare.  Arneson suggests that at least the following three considerations 
should figure in the determination of appropriate state policy: (1)  the state’s 
“legitimate interest in promoting good childrearing to boost people’s 
lifetime expected well-being,” (2) its interest in “promoting CSF[s] to boost 
people’s lifetime expected well-being,” and (3) its interest in promoting 
social arrangements that bring us closer to a world in which the average 
well-being level of men and women is roughly the same.8
Having emphasized the state’s legitimate role in promoting welfare, 
and having identified the corresponding considerations that must govern 
state regulation of love and childrearing, Arneson goes on to raise a host 
of questions about appropriate social policies.  As our experience with 
the great utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, has brought 
us to expect—and as Arneson ably demonstrates—once one adopts a 
consequentialist perspective, the social world never looks quite the 
same.9  The question of the proper shape of social institutions becomes wide 
open—up for grabs and re-envisioning, constrained only by considerations 
of welfare and by such contingencies as our empirical investigations may 
reveal.  Traditional institutions and practices have no intrinsic normative 
weight.  That is to say, institutions and practices have no per se authority 
simply because they are traditional.  Of course, the fact that they are 
longstanding and the source of expectations and reliance will partly 
determine the consequences of either retaining or altering them; and 
their consequences will make them relevant to consequentialist planning.  
But then any normative force they may possess must derive from 
whatever contingent role they happen to play in advancing welfare. 
The state has long advanced welfare by bundling childrearing and 
CSFs in one social institution, that of traditional marriage.  As Arneson 
observes, however, one can ask whether childrearing and CSFs are best 
 8. Arneson, supra note 1, at 984.  
 9. See, e.g, JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Meuthen & Co. 1970) (1789); JOHN 
STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN, in THREE ESSAYS 425 (2d ed., Frederick A. 
Stokes Co. 1911) (1869).  In our time, the utilitarian best known for drawing out what 
some find the rather startling implications of utilitarianism is Peter Singer.  See PETER 
SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE & DEATH (1994).  Singer’s qualified support for such policies 
as the availability of euthanasia in cases of severe birth defects has brought him not only 
the derision of disability activists, who mistake his position for advocacy of genocide or 
eugenics, but death threats.  See Claudette Vaughan, Is This a Dangerous Philosopher?  
The Peter Singer Interview, VEGAN VOICE MAG. (Australia),  Feb. 2002, at 7–10,  
available at http://www.animal-lib.org.au/more_interviews/singer; Harriet McBryde Johnson, 
Unspeakable Conversations or How I Spent One Day as a Token Cripple at Princeton 
University, N.Y. TIMES MAG, Feb. 16, 2003, at 50. 
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promoted by their being bundled in this way.  One can ask whether 
traditional marriage—that is, legally regulated, opposite sex, two person 
marriage—is, in all cases, the best vehicle for promoting either or both.  
Our efforts to answer these questions would properly depend, at least in 
large part, on careful empirical investigation.10
As already indicated, I am not inclined to defend state regulation of 
childrearing and intimate relationships on purely consequentialist grounds.  
Still, it is worth emphasizing the significant virtues of Arneson’s own 
consequentialist approach.  Perhaps chief among them is the sheer light 
it brings, for it helps to expose key issues often missed in public debates 
about marriage—about whether it should be harder or easier to enter and 
exit marriage, and about who should be permitted to enter it in the first 
place.  As his approach makes clear, we need to distinguish the “meaning” 
of marriage as an institution the state has an interest in recognizing and 
regulating, from the “meaning” of marriage as supplied by religious 
institutions or other civil associations.  Having made this distinction, we 
can begin to investigate which of the underlying values promoted by 
traditional marriage the state has any legitimate role in advancing.  We 
can also begin to consider whether traditional marriage or some 
alternative marital and childrearing arrangements might best promote 
those values. 
Certain concerns that one might have about Arneson’s approach and 
his substantive suggestions can be addressed relatively easily.  One 
might wonder, for example, whether his approach sufficiently respects 
the importance to many people’s identities of biological relationships 
which may be upset when CSFs and childrearing are not bundled.  One 
might also wonder whether Arneson’s approach takes sufficiently 
seriously the importance of the accumulated wisdom that underlies 
traditional social institutions, and so the importance of going slowly 
when it comes to altering arrangements which appear to have long 
 10. It would depend as well on our theory of welfare.  Arneson takes no position 
on the nature of well-being in his essay, taking for granted wide agreement about “what 
is desirable and worthwhile.”  Arneson, supra note 1, at 982.  While this strategy is 
generally fair, for reasons I hope will become clear later, which theory of welfare we 
adopt makes a larger difference than Arneson seems to allow.  It matters not only to how 
we come out substantively on the question of which institutional arrangements and social 
policies to favor; it also matters to our choice of framework for addressing that question.  
It matters in this way because some conceptions of welfare may contain peculiarly 
nonconsequentialist elements. 




served important human purposes reasonably well.11  In particular, one 
might stress that we ought to go very slowly when it comes to further 
eroding an institution so critical to the welfare of children and, thereby, 
to social structure and stability.  But the consequentialism Arneson 
favors will surely give due regard to these matters, at least insofar as 
they bear on welfare, if the facts are as those who might raise these 
points would seem to believe. 
A different concern begins to move us closer to those more theoretical 
disagreements which I tabled for purposes of the conference.  As I 
expressed it during the session on Arneson’s paper, one might wonder 
whether his approach permits him to engage fully with those who do not 
share his views of sexuality, love, and childrearing—those who do not 
think casual, harmless sex acts are “good per se,” who would not hail the 
advent of the orgasmatron, who fear any unbundling of marriage and 
childrearing.12
The moral philosopher R.M. Hare famously observed that people have 
not only interests but ideals, which they do not see as a mere matter of 
their welfare or preference and which they may be prepared to advance 
even when doing so conflicts with their welfare.13  Hare struggled to 
reconcile the role of ideals with his own utilitarianism.  In the end, he 
seems to have wanted to treat a person’s attachment to an ideal as just 
another interest which might or might not be outweighed in the 
utilitarian calculus that takes place in what he called level-two or 
“critical” moral thinking.14  But not all moral philosophers, not even all 
of those within the utilitarian camp, have been so quick to abandon 
ideals as expressing values distinct from welfare.15
 11. For an example of the sort of conservative view that underlies this worry, see 
JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR STRAIGHTS, 
AND GOOD FOR AMERICA 159–71 (2004) (distinguishing and evaluating two versions of 
Hayekianism and arguing that the milder, more plausible form does not count against 
gay marriage).  See also Amy L. Wax, The Conservative’s Dilemma: Traditional 
Institutions, Social Change, and Same-Sex Marriage, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1059 
(2005). 
 12. Arneson has rightly insisted that many people who disagree deeply can 
nevertheless fruitfully discuss issues by, say, adopting the other’s perspective for 
argument’s sake and then challenging that very perspective.  I never meant to deny this, 
but my earlier, too brief comments failed to make my point clear.  As I would now 
express it, my point is that Arneson’s approach may prevent him from engaging fully 
with those who do not share his views insofar as it leads him, as explained in the next 
section, to miss what may be correct in their position. 
 13. See R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 137–85 (1963). 
 14. See R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND POINT §§ 10.1, 
10.4–10.7 (1981). 
 15. Indeed, some utilitarians and perfectionists think the fundamental evaluative 
category is good, not welfare.  See, e.g., GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA ¶¶ 
110–35 (1903); Donald H. Regan, Why am I My Brother’s Keeper?, in REASON AND 
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I suggest that those on the other side of the current marriage debate may 
be seen as holding a certain ideal of love and family life.  That ideal is of 
the traditional, nuclear family, with enduring, romantic love between a 
man and a woman together with childrearing.16  No doubt those who hold 
this ideal also think that adhering to it—matching one’s life to it—also 
enhances individual welfare.  But that need not be their primary reason for 
embracing it.  The ideal stands in need of both further articulation and 
solid grounding, of course.  One would like to know precisely why it is an 
ideal—something normative.  The important point, however, is that the 
ideal might be thought to express a value not reducible to whatever impact 
adhering to it may have on individual well-being.  The question then 
naturally arises whether the state has a legitimate interest in promoting a 
value or ideal apart from its impact on people’s welfare.  I believe, and 
will argue later, that it does, though it is a value or ideal at best 
imperfectly expressed by the ideal of the traditional nuclear family.  Or, to 
put the point more precisely, the traditional nuclear family is but one 
context for realizing the nonwelfarist value that the state has a legitimate 
interest in promoting. 
Notice that the appeal to ideals is captured by neither the Lockean nor 
the consequentialist approaches that Arneson sketches, at least not as 
something of independent normative weight.  And yet it seems that those 
who describe themselves as concerned with the protection of traditional 
marriage—those who express dismay about Las Vegas wedding chapels 
and Caribbean quickie divorces, who express grave concern that 
permitting same-sex marriage will erode traditional marriage—may 
regard themselves not as mere defenders of tradition but as advocates for 
an ideal that merits our deepest concern and our steadiest support.  They 
may insist, moreover, that if a democratic society chooses to uphold 
such an ideal, that is enough to justify the state in its promotion.17
VALUE: THEMES FROM THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH RAZ 202 (R. Jay Wallace et al. 
eds., 2004); Thomas Hurka, ‘Good’ and ‘Good For,’ 96 MIND 71, 71–73 (1987). 
 16. For a bit of evidence that such an ideal lies behind the views of some contemporary 
opponents of same-sex marriage, see Christopher Wolfe, Why the Federal Marriage 
Amendment is Necessary, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 895, 916–21 (2005).  For helpful 
examination of the limitations of conservative arguments against same-sex marriage, see 
RICHARD H. DEES, TRUST AND TOLERATION 120–44 (2004). 
 17. Moving beyond ideals, those who think certain forms of sexual conduct and 
certain forms of interpersonal relationships are intrinsically immoral—same-sex or 
polygamous arrangements—will reject the consequentialist picture Arneson favors.  
Wolfe evidently takes such a view.  See Wolfe, supra note 16, at 897–98.  




I suspect that Arneson, like me, would be inclined to say that the 
proper approach to state regulation of marital and childrearing arrangements 
will leave people largely free to hold their ideals and adhere to them 
with like-minded people.18  But of course, those who embrace the ideal 
of traditional marriage worry about its fragility in an environment in 
which it receives no special sanction and support.  Preserving that ideal 
need not require that society withhold its recognition from marital 
arrangements that depart in one way or another from traditional marriage.  
Perhaps, as a number of conservatives have argued, permitting same-sex 
marriages would enhance rather than erode the ideal, or at least what is 
truly essential to it.19  But we cannot hope to preserve the ideal of 
traditional marriage, or whatever genuine value it may imperfectly 
reflect, without proper recognition of what may be at stake, and what 
may be at stake is the thing that I worry may be obscured by the 
prioritarian approach. 
In response to my comments, Arneson fairly notes that the theoretical 
issues that divide welfare consequentialists from believers in nonwelfarist 
ideals go far beyond what he could possibly attempt to address, and he 
reasonably questions the precise relation ideals stand in to welfare.20  To the 
extent that ideals ultimately have normative force, they may have it only 
insofar as they form an integral part of our welfare or insofar as they may be 
instrumental to our leading flourishing lives.  Arneson rightly observes that 
“the nature and depth of the disagreement between one who holds that some 
values are impersonal and do not reduce to well-being gains and losses and 
one who denies the existence of such values depend on the consequentialist’s 
understanding of well-being.”21  But the disagreement does not depend on 
that alone, and it is precisely this that prioritarian consequentialism may lead 
us to miss.22  The difficulty, I will be suggesting, is not, as Arneson remarks, 
that the emphasis on well-being may “seem crass from some ideal-based 
perspectives.”23  Rather, there is something to the conservative idea that the 
 18. Allowing people to hold ideals and adhere to them obviously does not require 
the state to put its imprimatur on them or to provide their adherents with the benefits that 
currently accompany marriage.  For example, the state might withhold the benefits of 
marriage from those who have children and maintain relationships with multiple 
partners; the state might even decide to withdraw all benefits from traditional marriage 
and, indeed, to get out of the marriage business altogether. 
 19. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom: A (Conservative) Case for 
Gay Marriage, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 28, 1989, at 20; RAUCH, supra note 11, at 11–54 
(discussing which of the ideas associated with traditional marriage is really essential to 
marriage). 
 20. Arneson, supra note 1, at 995.  
 21. Id.  
 22. I say may, because, as I point out at the end of this essay, just what theoretical 
commitments a consequentialist may take on board is itself a large theoretical issue. 
 23. Arneson, supra note 1, at 995.  
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state has a legitimate interest in advancing some values regardless of 
whether they are reducible to welfare, and so there is also something to 
the conservative’s apparent insistence that the meaning of marriage is 
not exhausted by its impact on welfare.24
II.  MARRIAGE AND MEANING 
Whether or not one views traditional marriage as an ideal, it is worth 
reflecting on why those who do might reasonably find it especially 
normative.  Much has already been written about what marriage 
achieves such that society has a serious interest in its preservation.  For 
example, Jonathan Rauch, in his defense of gay marriage, convincingly 
emphasizes the importance to society of marriage, as a social and legal 
institution, insofar as it helps to settle the young, especially young men, 
and provides for reliable, mutual caretaking by adults.25  My sense, 
however, is that if we emphasize only such effects of marriage, 
important though they are, we will fail to get to the heart of the matter; 
we will not yet have gained full insight into whatever special normative 
significance marriage might have.  Though I have indicated my interest 
in trying to vindicate the conservative idea that marriage and family 
have a foundational role in social life, in what follows, I will not attempt 
to track how conservatives understand this idea or to consider why they 
hold it.  Rather, I want to engage in some speculations of my own.  The 
emphasis here is on the word “speculations” for I offer mere hypotheses, 
broad conjectures that must still be tested by analysis and argument of a 
sort I cannot undertake to offer here.  My suggestion will be that 
although we ought not to adopt the view of traditional marriage as itself 
an ideal, we ought to embrace a different yet closely related ideal or 
value, and this value may indeed serve to underwrite the importance 
 24. I should mention that I use such expressions as “the conservative idea” and 
“the conservative’s apparent insistence” with some misgivings.  I am suspicious of the 
label “conservative,” because those who willingly apply it to themselves and their own 
views seem to hold more varied theoretical and practical positions than the label would 
imply. 
 25. See RAUCH, supra note 11, at 18–19.  Rauch observes that settling the young, 
especially young men, is critical to social stability, as unmarried men are far more likely 
to be involved in antisocial behavior.  As for how same-sex marriage ought to come 
about, Rauch defends a state-by-state, federalist approach.  RAUCH, supra note 11, at 
172–91.  For an opposing view, see EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2004) (arguing in support of Supreme Court recognition of same-sex 
marriage).  See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON (Andrew Sullivan ed., 
1997) (containing essays expressing a variety of views about same-sex marriage). 




marriage has seemed to many to have.  Before presenting my speculations, 
however, let me offer a few thoughts prompted by the sessions and the 
many conversations that took place at the meaning of marriage conference. 
In reflecting on the conference I was most struck by two related 
things.  The first was the variety of takes participants had on the theme 
of the conference.  Participants responded to the theme of the “meaning 
of marriage” by exploring a range of topics, including the implications 
of empirical research into the sundry effects of marriage as a social 
institution and the relative merits of conservative and liberal views about 
same-sex marriage.  They advanced views about appropriate social and 
legal methodology for thinking about questions relating to marriage, sex, 
and childrearing and challenged the expertise of lawyers to speak to 
these questions.  Participants’ wide-ranging treatments were no doubt 
prompted by the expansive questions raised in the letter of invitation for 
the conference, as well as by differences in their research methods and 
interests.26  Still, I would have liked to hear more explanation of why 
each participant approached the theme as he or she did. 
I was perhaps even more struck, though, by how little seemed to be 
asked or addressed in the way of conceptual questions.  Not only did 
conferees leave largely unexplored what the question of the “meaning of 
marriage” might concern, but they largely assumed a shared understanding 
of what marriage is.27  I make these observations not to imply any criticisms.  
Conferees explored the issues posed for the conference in very fruitful 
ways.  But I was left wondering whether the inattention to more conceptual 
questions forestalled a deeper exploration of the underlying normative 
issues.  I believe these issues sorely need exploration if we are to make 
further progress in contemporary debates about marriage and childrearing.  I 
therefore want to offer some preliminary thoughts about the theme of the 
conference and the concept of a marriage. 
The question “What is the meaning of marriage?” naturally invites at 
least two distinct inquiries.  The first concerns the nature of marriage.  
Just what is a marriage—what is the nature of the thing about whose 
meaning we inquire?  The second concerns marriage’s meaning.  Just 
what is an inquiry into something’s “meaning,” and given the nature of 
such an inquiry, what might we say about the meaning of marriage in 
particular?  I am most interested in the second inquiry, and I return to it 
shortly.  I want to begin, however, by offering some thoughts about the 
first inquiry. 
 26. Brian Bix makes note of these questions in his essay, Everything I Know About 
Marriage I Learned from Law Professors, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 825 (2005). 
 27. But see id. at 826–27.  Bix briefly discusses the question of how marriage is to 
be defined, though that is not precisely the same as the question of what marriage is. 
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It is tempting to think that it is obvious what marriage is.  It is tempting to 
think that we possess a single, social understanding of marriage, an 
understanding at once transparent, widely shared, and fundamental.28  
Most participants at the conference focused on marriage as a particular 
social institution or, rather, as a social institution that has had a characteristic 
form in our culture.  But in fact, inspection of our talk about marriage 
suggests that the term ‘marriage’ is used to convey a number of ideas, 
with varying descriptive and normative content.  I want to distinguish 
here between three types of talk about marriage. 
The first is partly descriptive and partly normative.  Both Arneson and 
Cheshire Calhoun characterize marriage, in their respective essays, as a 
(socially sanctioned) union that serves a number of important purposes.  
Arneson talks, as we have seen, in terms of committed sexual friendships 
involving sexual intimacy, close friendship, and shared life projects.29  
Calhoun notes that marriage has long been thought of as a “multipurpose 
association” that is supposed to satisfy a plurality of needs—for sexual 
and emotional intimacy, reproduction, childrearing, and the care of 
adults’ material needs.30  As both observe, there may be problems with 
looking to a single union as a locus for satisfying all of these needs, 
though as Arneson also observes, certain considerations may tend to 
militate in favor of arrangements roughly along the lines of traditional 
marriage.31
The sort of union Arneson and Calhoun depict is itself a kind of ideal.  
Notice, however, that as familiar as the ideal they describe is, not all talk 
about marriage is closely tied to the idea of a multipurpose union.  Some 
of our talk is more purely descriptive and treats marriage merely as a 
legal institution that creates a binding relation between parties.  More or 
 28. During one session at the conference, Christopher Wolfe suggested that there 
is such a social understanding, but for reasons that I offer herein and could only gesture 
toward at the time, I have doubts about this. 
 29. Arneson, supra note 1, at 983.  
 30. See Cheshire Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage?, 42 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1023, 1030 (2005) (citing KAREN STRUENING, NEW FAMILY VALUES: LIBERTY, 
EQUALITY, DIVERSITY 85 (2002)). 
 31. These considerations are, as Arneson expresses them, that children are 
generally better off when “raised under the steady supervision of a small number (larger 
than one) of parent or guardian individuals who have primary direct responsibility for 
meeting the child’s needs and carry out this function without interruption until the child 
is grown,” and that adults are generally better off if they live “with at least one other 
adult who is both a long-term friend and a long-term sexual partner.”  Arneson, supra 
note 1, at 989. 
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less rigid social roles and expectations may accompany membership in 
this legal union, but they need form no essential part of it.  Varying legal 
rules govern the relation of marriage—the terms of its membership, 
initiation, and dissolution—as well as the terms of ownership and control 
over property and authority over and access to offspring.  Traditionally, 
marriage as a legal relation has been limited to heterosexual couples.  
But although, by our own tradition, only two, opposite-sex people can be 
married to each other at a time, nothing about marriage in the legal sense 
precludes a person from standing in like legal relations to more than one 
person at a time or to persons of the same sex.  It is all a matter of the 
rules.  Polygamy is, after all, marriage to multiple partners, and such 
“plural marriage,” as it is sometimes called, has historically been legally 
sanctioned in many places.  At least since the emergence of an ideal of 
companionate marriage, marriage is supposed to occur between persons 
who have fallen in love.  But marriage as a legal relation need be 
premised on no particular feelings between the partners—a mail-order or 
arranged union is as good, from the legal standpoint, as a romantic 
union.  There need be no sexual contact nor any emotional intimacy.  
The legal relation has generally been treated as a prelude to, and a 
relation entered into partly in the interest of, producing and rearing 
children.  Nevertheless, partners can be legally married yet have no 
children and, indeed, be engaged in no shared undertakings whatsoever.  
Britney Spears was as legally married in those fleeting twenty-four hours 
after her first walk down the aisle as were Bob and Dolores Hope after 
sixty-nine years of marriage. 
Rules governing the legal relation of marriage, then, may or may not 
limit it to heterosexual partners, to two partners, to mutually consenting 
adults, or to those who undertake childrearing.  The law need not be 
bound by marriage’s conceptual limits, whatever those might be, but 
even if it were, nothing in the very concept of marriage would seem to 
dictate all of our traditional limits on the form and function of marriage 
as a legal or social institution.  Arguably it does not, for example, dictate 
the prevalent legal restriction of marriage to opposite-sex partners.  
Supporters of same-sex marriage may be criticized (wrongly) for advocating 
“immorality” and supporting a misguided social policy.  They may also 
be criticized (wrongly) for embracing the supposedly undesirable and 
conventional social institution of marriage, which gays would allegedly 
do better to shun.  But they cannot, I believe, plausibly be criticized for 
conceptual confusion. 
This last observation brings us to a third kind of talk about marriage.  
Talk about marriage of this third kind is perhaps closely tied to talk of 
the first kind, but I treat it separately to emphasize a certain, quite 
critical point: Some of our talk about marriage is what we might call 
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richly normative.  When I say that some of our talk is richly normative, I 
do not mean to suggest that it has no descriptive content.  On the 
contrary, its normativity is strongly tied to that content.  Still, central to 
this talk about marriage is a fundamental moral relation between partners.  
This moral relation is accompanied by a characteristic emotional bond, a 
being in love with rather than a merely loving.  This moral relation is 
also accompanied by a characteristic joining of forces, a uniting for 
common purposes rather than for what remain purely personal endeavors.  
In these respects it is akin to Arneson and Calhoun’s ideal of a 
multipurpose union.  Its normatively distinguishing mark, however, is 
not romantic love as such, but a deep bond that is partly constituted by 
an abiding valuing of one another.32  This bond, the care each has for the 
other, manifests itself in acts of caretaking, of nurturing and support.  
But as Stephen Darwall has recently observed in his work on welfare, in 
caring for another we regard him or her as worthy of care—as having a 
value that warrants our caretaking acts quite apart from the fact that we 
happen to care.33  Such is the regard loving parents have for their 
children and devoted spouses for one another. 
Talk about marriage in this third sense is, I suspect, what we hear 
when people describe a legally unmarried couple as married or a legally 
married couple as not having a real marriage.  On this understanding, 
Britney Spears, despite a legally binding union, was no more married  
to—what was his name?—than she was to any number of men she had 
dated without ending the evening at the Little White Wedding Chapel on 
the Las Vegas Strip.34  And the same-sex couple, still together after ten 
 32. It might seem that I am confusing the love and care that exist in personal 
relationships for the more abstract moral love and concern we are supposed to have for 
all persons.  The last thing I mean to suggest is that the love we feel for our partners and 
our valuing of them is identical in all respect to our love for and valuing of persons as 
such.  My point is that insofar as our marital relations are moral relations, their moral 
character rests not in romance but in regard for the other’s value.  Of course, that is the 
same regard that, according to Kantian ethics, morality requires us to have for all 
persons.  My second point will be precisely that this regard seems to come more easily in 
the context of personal relationships.  Morality requires us to value mere others in a 
certain way in which we more readily value intimates.  I will not try to settle whether my 
second point is purely empirical or at least partly conceptual.  Obviously to the extent 
that it is empirical, it will require support that goes well beyond the mere suggestions I 
am able to offer here. 
 33. See STEPHEN DARWALL, WELFARE AND RATIONAL CARE 8 (2002). 
 34. Blink and You Missed Spears’ First Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2004, at 
A11. 




years, may be as married as any like, legally married heterosexual 
couple, despite the fact that their relationship lacks the law’s sanction. 
While I have not tried to offer an analysis of the concept of marriage, I 
believe that insofar as there is a well-formed concept of marriage, any 
efforts at analysis would do best to begin with this third kind of talk.  
Whether or not marriage admits of conceptual or philosophical analysis, 
however, it is talk of marriage in this third sense that I find of greatest 
interest, for reasons that will become clear as my hypotheses emerge.  
Before spelling out the earlier promised speculations, now would be the 
right time to turn to our second inquiry—inquiry about the meaning of 
marriage. 
Various things might be meant by an inquiry into the “meaning” of 
marriage.  One might be inquiring, among other things, into the significance 
people actually attach to a certain social institution, into the real world 
effects and operation of that social institution, or into its complex, 
possibly shifting normative foundations and their bearing on appropriate 
state policies.  Arneson, as I understand him, engages in roughly this last 
sort of inquiry.  In one signification of the term ‘meaning,’ the meaning 
of something is its value or, more precisely, the values it serves.  
Arneson’s approach, as we have seen, is to investigate the values the 
state may have a legitimate interest in promoting, values it has partly 
promoted through a certain social institution—traditional marriage.  He 
then treats as separable questions whether those values are best promoted as 
a single bundle and whether they are best promoted through traditional 
marriage itself. 
Arneson, as a prioritarian consequentialist, views the state’s legitimate 
regulatory role in the areas of intimate relationships and childrearing as 
based on the promotion of welfare.  The state has a legitimate interest in 
advancing the welfare of those who reside within its territory, and 
because people’s welfare is critically affected by good childrearing and 
CSFs, the state may legitimately promote both.  This seems right, so far 
as it goes, but it leaves unanswered certain fundamental theoretical 
questions, chief among them, why we should care about people’s 
welfare in the first place.35  Why would people’s welfare make a 
normative claim on the state?  I am inclined to answer this question along 
the lines suggested in recent work by a number of moral philosophers: 
people’s welfare matters because they matter; their welfare makes a 
normative claim on us because they have a value for which we must 
 35. Arneson has indicated to me that he thinks welfare is uncontroversially 
normative.  See Comments from Richard Arneson, to Connie Rosati, supra note 7, at 3.  
He may be right that welfare is normative, but Mooreans have historically disputed this.  
See generally Regan and Hurka, supra note 15. 
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have proper regard.36  The idea that persons have an inherent value 
which both places limits on how we may act and places demands on us 
to act derives, of course, from the ethical theory of Immanuel Kant.37  
According to Kantian ethics, morality rests on the value of persons, or 
more precisely, on the value of rational nature, a value reflected in the 
various formulations of the moral law. 
The speculations I want to offer have their starting point in the 
foregoing considerations, and they rest upon a number of assumptions.  
Suppose, first, that the broadly Kantian picture of ethics is correct.  
Suppose further that social stability and coherence fundamentally 
depends upon our more or less perfectly operative capacity to recognize 
others as having a value we may not violate.  Finally, suppose that it is, 
ordinarily, through the emotion of love that we first come to apprehend 
value in another—love of the sort that we see in intimate, romantic 
relationships and in the relationship between parent and child.38  Then 
we can begin to see why the state would have a special interest in 
fostering such relationships. 
Our welfare is no doubt advanced through our involvement in 
intimate, romantic relationships and through good parenting; it is also 
advanced by broader social stability and coherence.  The state has an 
interest in advancing our welfare because the state is both warranted in 
 36. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 91–92 
(1993); DARWALL, supra note 33, at 8; J. David Velleman, A Right of Self-Termination?, 
109 ETHICS 606, 610–13 (1999). 
 37. See Donald H. Regan, The Value of Rational Nature, 112 ETHICS 267 (2002).  
For a reply to Regan, see David Sussman, The Authority of Humanity, 113 ETHICS 350 
(2003).  See generally IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
(Lewis White Beck trans., Robert Paul Wolff ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1969) (1785).  
Philosophers have, of course, challenged the idea that persons of rational nature have 
inherent value.   
 38. Whether social stability and coherence indeed depends on our capacity to see 
others as valuable seems to me to be an empirical matter.  Whether we first come to 
apprehend the value of another through the emotion of love, may be a purely empirical 
matter, or it may be at least partly conceptual.  See supra note 31.  My supposition that it 
is through love that we first come to apprehend value in another should not be confused 
with the idea that love just is an apprehension of value in another.  For defense of a view 
roughly along those lines which links love to Kantian ethics, see J. David Velleman, 
Love as a Moral Emotion, 109 ETHICS 338 (1999).  But if something like the latter view 
were correct, then the link between love and apprehension of value would indeed be 
partly conceptual.  For an exploration of how good parenting involves appreciation of the 
value of a child, see Connie S. Rosati, Autonomy and Personal Good: Lessons from 
Frankenstein’s Monster 25–26 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the San 
Diego Law Review); Connie S. Rosati, Preference-Formation and Personal Good, 
PHILOSOPHY (forthcoming 2006) (on file with San Diego Law Review). 
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having and obligated to have a proper regard for our value.  The state 
advances our welfare and exhibits proper regard for our value not only 
by acting in ways that are consonant with our value; it also does so by 
doing what it can to promote the conditions that make for social 
stability.  These will be conditions in which we come to have a proper 
regard for the value of one another, or in which we at least come to act 
in accordance with a proper regard for the value of one another.  Insofar 
as our capacity to appreciate the value of others becomes active in our 
most personal of relationships, the state has a special interest in 
protecting and supporting these relationships. 
The legal relation of marriage has been one vehicle by which the state 
protects and supports these relationships, and inchoate recognition of 
this fact seems to lie behind the third kind of talk about marriage—the 
talk that treats marriage as a fundamental moral relation.  But it is 
“genuine” marriage with its abiding, valuing of another that the state has 
a fundamental interest in advancing and securing, rather than traditional 
marriage per se.  What the legal relation of marriage must look like in 
order for the state to advance genuine marriage is a complex question.  It 
may well be that the law will have to treat marriage as something at least 
roughly along the lines of traditional marriage.  For instance, it may have 
to treat marriage as a relation limited to two adults.  Whatever the 
correct answer to this question may be, recognizing marriage as a legal 
relation will remain a quite imperfect means of advancing genuine 
marriage.  Recognition of the legal relation will secure protections and 
benefits for relationships that fall far short of the ideal—that show 
contempt rather than consideration for the value of another.  But apart 
from setting higher bars to entry or exit, something along the lines of 
traditional marriage may be the best the state can do without intolerable 
intrusion into the private sphere that would do more to hinder than foster 
our appreciation of one another. 
The foregoing considerations raise various puzzles, of course, which I 
merely mention here.  One puzzle concerns why, and the extent to which, 
our capacity to appreciate the value of another becomes active within 
these close interpersonal relationships.  It would be good to have a more 
complete account of the normative, psychological, and evolutionary 
bases for this, though no doubt, some of the requisite materials for 
providing it already exist.  A second puzzle concerns how and why our 
ability to appreciate the value of the ones we love would have any 
tendency to generalize in ways that make possible not a mere social life 
but a recognizably moral social life.  One possibility might be that the 
value one sees in the individual one loves is a value the beloved shares 
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in common with others.39  That is to say, the very thing one apprehends 
in apprehending her value is something that she has, not due to her merit 
or her idiosyncratic features; rather, it is something she simply has, a 
value that inheres in her as in all others.  To apprehend her value is, at 
the same time, to apprehend the value of persons.  Another possibility 
might be that the value one sees in the individual one loves generalizes 
via the operation of reason: One apprehends the inherent value of 
another, a value she simply has, and one sees as well that no reason can 
be given why that individual has inherent value, while others lack it.  
Whatever explanation we might ultimately offer, a final puzzle will 
concern why and how our capacity to apprehend the value of another can 
fail to become activated or to generalize appropriately.40
Again, I simply mention these as problems that remain to be explored.  
The point I want to make for present purposes is that the foregoing 
considerations, with suitable development, will go as far as we can go, I 
believe, toward vindicating the conservative emphasis on the primacy of 
marriage and the family.  And such considerations will do much to 
vindicate that primacy, for they make sense of how marriage and family 
could indeed be so fundamental to society.  I suggested earlier that there 
is an ideal or value closely related to the ideal of traditional marriage 
that we ought to embrace and that would ground what many have seen to 
be the fundamental importance of marriage.  Let me now state that 
earlier claim a bit more precisely.  The value that underlies the 
importance of marriage and family, I have been suggesting, is the value 
of persons, and the ideal related to that of traditional marriage is an ideal 
of appropriate and abiding valuing of another.  Insofar as the framework 
I have been sketching is correct, the foundations of moral life and the 
basis for social cohesion are to be found in intimate romantic and 
familial relationships, for it is in the context of these relationships that 
the ideal can get a hold on us.  Insofar as love brings us to appreciate 
another’s value and insofar as appreciation of our value grounds 
morality and has stabilizing effects, it is in the context of our loving 
relations that moral and social life finds its roots.  Yet if the foregoing 
considerations provide support for conservative emphasis on the 
importance of marriage and family, they also provide the normative 
 39. See Velleman, supra note 38, at 366. 
 40. Obviously, each of these possible explanations stands in need of a great deal of 
development and defense.  I take no position here as to which, if either, we ought to 
adopt. 




basis for rejecting many conservative ideas about the form each must 
properly take.  In particular, we cannot plausibly deny that same-sex 
partners experience genuine love for one another or an appreciation for 
the value of each other.  And it is just this genuine love and appreciation 
which we should seek to foster.  To the extent that extending the legal 
relation of marriage to homosexuals helps to encourage regard for the 
value of another, much as it does in opposite-sex marriage, the state has 
compelling reasons to extend the boundaries of the legal relation of 
marriage to encompass same-sex unions. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In offering the foregoing speculations, my aim has not been to try to 
settle the question of what framework we ought to adopt for assessing 
state policies regarding private relationships and childrearing.  It has 
merely been to set out an alternative to Arneson’s framework in an effort 
to articulate what I worry the latter framework may lead us to miss.  And 
that is not simply, as my brief remarks at the conference misleadingly 
suggested, a distinct normative role for ideals or values not reducible to 
welfare.  Rather, it is the role of a particular value that is not reducible 
to welfare because it grounds welfare’s normativity.41  I can imagine, 
given his reply to my remarks at the conference, how Arneson might 
respond.  He might say, to repeat those remarks, that the extent to which 
our preferred frameworks are really in tension will depend on the 
conception of welfare the consequentialist adopts, and with this I agree.  
In fact, the conception of welfare or personal good I favor itself reduces 
the tension, because it sees goodness for a person as partly constituted 
by the tendency of a thing to support a person’s sense of her own 
value.42  Still, the extent of the tension does not depend solely on what 
conception of welfare we adopt.  If Kantian ethics is right, it resides in 
the very structure of value, or as Kant might have put it, in the relation 
between conditioned and unconditioned value.43
Complex theoretical questions remain, of course.  On the one side, it 
remains to be settled whether a consequentialism that deserves the name 
 41. We can now see why the problem is not that the emphasis on welfare is 
somehow crass, as Arneson’s reply to my conference comments suggested.  It is that the 
emphasis misleads in certain ways. 
 42. See Connie S. Rosati, Personal Good, in METAETHICS AFTER MOORE (Mark 
Timmons & Terry Horgan eds., forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 17, on file with the 
San Diego Law Review). 
 43. Arneson’s written comments suggest even more complex theoretical replies, 
which challenge the Kantian picture of the structure of value.  For a hint of how these 
replies might go, see supra notes 35 & 44.  Here, of course, is the beginning of a very 
long debate. 
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must deny the value of persons and insist that only states of affairs are 
bearers of intrinsic value.  I can imagine that some who call themselves 
consequentialists may embrace the idea that welfare matters only 
because we matter.44  In the end, it matters very little what labels we 
choose to attach to our positions and very much what does and does not 
have value.  As for the other side, proponents of Kantian ethics have yet 
to satisfactorily articulate and defend the idea that persons have inherent 
value.  That murky idea continues to be, as many consequentialists 
would remind us, merely an idea in search of an argument.45  I 
personally find it a particularly gripping idea.  What I hope to have done 
is indicate how attention to it might deepen our understanding of the 

























 44. Of course, consequentialists are likely to want to cash out the value of persons 
in terms of the value of certain states of affairs involving their flourishing. 
 45. See Regan, supra note 37. 
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